Pakistan's National Uncertainties and its impact
Dated 16/12/2005
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Pakistan's hallmarks ever since its inception as a nation state in 1947 has been its pronounced negativities, unfounded paranoid fears and generating uncertainties – both internal and external.
Pakistan's very inception was negative. The demand for homeland for India's Muslims was a negative one, in the sense that the only leader spearheading the demand for Pakistan, namely Mohd. Ali Jinnah was spurred more by egotism and his inadequacies, comparatively, with the Indian freedom struggle towering leaders. Jinnah generated paranoid fears among the Muslims about their uncertain future in a democratic and secular free India.
On inception in 1947, Pakistan's national and external uncertainties continued to be in play. Its existence as a nation state was opposed by the provinces that the British awarded to the new Pakistan. The North West Frontier Province (Land of the Pakhtuns) opposed the creation of Pakistan. If it had geographical contiguity with India, the Frontier Province would have opted for India. Analytically, and in a hithertofore unpublished fact, what now strikes this author is that this may have resulted in Pakistan's morbid fears on Kashmir. The princely State of Jammu and Kashmir which acceded to India had its borders resting on the Frontier Province (NWFP) and had India reclaimed the western portion now occupied by Pakistan, NWFP would be bordering Indian territories with possible adverse consequences for Pakistan.
Baluchistan, which is nearly half the total size of Pakistan, and provides the bulk of Pakistan's coastline, openly opposed and refused to join Pakistan for more than a year. Pakistan ultimately had to use military force to virtually annex Baluchistan. Sind, likewise was not in favour of creation of Pakistan. The Sindhis have been struggling for self-determination. Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister had ordered that India’s Muslims migrating to Pakistan be re-settled in Sind in order to change the demographic composition and neutralize the the Sindhi self-determination demand.
Pakistani Punjab which now claims to be the "soul of Pakistan" never fought for the creation of Pakistan. Here too a political coup was carried out by the Muslim League on the eve of 1947 to bring in a provincial Government which said yes to creation of Pakistan.
East Pakistan, the more populated eastern wing of Pakistan and where the Muslim League was founded in 1906, soon became disillusioned with Punjabi imperialism and fought an armed struggle in 1971 to create a separate nation – Bangladesh.
Pakistan in the ensuing years after 1947 was obsessed with morbid fears that India would disintegrate Pakistan, either by military action or exploitation of self-determination demands of NWFP, Sind, Baluchistan and Bangladesh.
With the concept of Pakistan negated in 1947, itself, by more Indian Muslims opting to stay back in a secular India, Pakistan had to devise a new hysterical raison d’etre for holding the new state together i.e. Kashmir as a continuing propagation of the pernicious Two-Nation Theory on the grounds of Islamic affinity of the Kashmir Valley.
The conflictual stances of Pakistan, generated by its fears and uncertainties are in contemporary memory and need not be recounted. Except, for the benefit of Western policy and decision makers, it needs to be recorded that Pakistan was not only in conflict with India thereafter, but also with its co-religionist neighbour, namely Afghanistan. Pakistan feared that ethnic affinities in NWFP and Baluchistan with Afghanistan could lead to severance of these provinces.
Pakistan's uncertainties and the pangs of its birth have plagued Pakistan ever since and have impacted its national and external policies, including its partition in 1971. First, a look at Pakistan's national uncertainties as prevailing in 2005.
Pakistan's National Uncertainties in 2005
Pakistan even after attaining a nuclear-weapons State status in 1998 continues to be an "uncertain state" – uncertain about it's political, economic or strategic directions.
Pakistan’s political uncertainties can be summarized as under:
* Pakistan's quest for a national identity is yet incomplete
* Baluchistan is witnessing violent turbulence with an armed liberation struggle under-way
* NWFP, besides the demand for a greater Pakhtunistan is now witnessing Islamist armed rebellion against the Pakistan Government in Waziristan
* Punjab is plagued by sectarian violence between the Sunnis and Shias
* Sind is dominated both by sectarian and ethnic conflicts
* Popular resentment, though not channelised into a mass protest movement, exists against Pakistan Army's political stranglehold and its denial of democracy.
* A nationally uncertain Pakistan has contributed to lack of political ideologies in Pakistan (other than Islam), military adventurism and state-sponsored terrorism on both flanks again in the name of Islam. It has led to Pakistan’s international image as terrorist state and WMD proliferator.
The Islamic Jehadi violence which Pakistan state-sponsored against India and Afghanistan is now roosting back within Pakistan itself. This is starkly brought out by a Pakistani newspaper (The Daily Times) in an editorial on December 7, 2005 as under:
"The entire country has become linked in a network of terrorism which now boasts Al Qaeda style suicide bombings.
If you look at the map of the country the territories under challenge comprise the Northern Areas, the North and South Waziristan Agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and all of Balochistan, the largest province comprising 40% of Pakistan's territory.
One can easily say that half of Pakistan is in the grip of people whose way of life is violence and who is responsible for this, if not the Government (read Pakistan Army) which has been unable to tackle the problems that give rise to violence."
The Pakistani State is so uncertain of itself, that its military ruler is not confident of shedding his uniform, even as President.
Musharraf's uncertainties arise from fears that his fellow Generals may push him out of office, once he lays down the office of Army Chief.
The national uncertainties of Pakistan also have an external impact on its foreign policies as illustrated below, besides generating other external uncertainties.
Pakistan's Uncertainties Impact on India
India has consistently demonstrated in the last 58 years that it is neither interested in the disintegration of Pakistan nor exploiting its national uncertainties.
The Pakistani establishment would not like to believe it as this robs them of the motive of an external threat on which they thrive.
The Pakistani establishment for perpetuation of their hold on Pakistan have a vested interest in remaining politically and strategically fixated on an "Indian Threat".
The Indo-Pak peace process is severely impacted by this fixation of the Pakistani establishment. Pakistan's national uncertainties as reflected in the stances of Pakistan’s military ruler, raises questions in Indian minds, whether it is worth the while to go an extra political mile in the Indo-Pak peace dialogue.
Pakistan's national uncertainties impel it to exist as a "garrison state" with disproportionate expenditure on over-kill armaments, more offensive than defensive. This generates a corresponding impact on India's weapons acquisitions, keeping in mind Pakistan's military mis-adventures against India, both overt and covert. The irony is that India can afford such an arms race while Pakistan cannot.
Pakistan strategic uncertainties in relation to India has tempted it to indulge in proxy war and state-sponsored terrorism against India creating avoidable violence and turbulence. This generates strong demands within India for punitive military action against Pakistan.
In terms of other external impact, this paper would confine itself only to the United States and China, whose intrusive influence in South Asia's regional balance of power was facilitated by Pakistan's national uncertainties.
The United States and Pakistan's National Uncertainties
The United States has adroitly exploited Pakistan's national uncertainties to its strategic advantage at different stages.
During the Cold War, resentful of India not joining the containment ring against the Soviet Union, the United States exploited Pakistan's national uncertainties by drawing it into its security alliances.
During the closing stages of the Cold War, the United States exploited Pakistan's national uncertainties vis-à-vis the Soviets in Afghanistan to launch a proxy war for America through a new weapon – Islamic Jehadi warfare and in the process creating Osama bin Laden and global terrorism whose ultimate scourge made a visitation on Homeland USA on 9/11.
Post 9/11 the United States has not only exploited Pakistan's national uncertainties but also to soothe its own strategic uncertainties vis-à-vis Islamic Jehad to indulge in a delusionary strategic policy of artificially propping up General Musharaf’s continuance of military rule.
In the above process the negative impacts have been:
* United States all along, has a vested interest in Pakistan being governed by military dictators.
* In the said process, the United States – Pak Generals nexus has resulted in preventing the emergence of democracy in Pakistan
* Generated India's trust-deficit in United States policies in South Asia
The net result of all of the above being that both Pakistan and the United States are losers. In the Pakistan-perceived national hour of its need, in 1965 and 1971, the United States did not side with Pakistan. This creates strategic uncertainties within Pakistan about the value of its relationship with the United States.
China and Pakistan's National Uncertainties
China was a comparative late player in the game of exploiting Pakistan's national uncertainties as compared to the United States. China’s role commenced in the post-1962 Sino-Indian War phase and adopted more forceful profiles after the 1971 India-Pakistan War leading to the dismemberment of Pakistan. 1971 marked the emergence of India as the dominant power in South Asia, which China had to check-mate and this could be done predominantly through Pakistan.
Pakistan's a nuclear weapons and ballistic missile arsenal was built by China in pursuance of this objective. Today, once again, Pakistan's strategic uncertainties focus on the United States and not China. For Pakistan's decision makers, the country's national uncertainties can best be insured against future uncertainties by relying on China than USA. The above could lead to a more reinforced Chinese presence in Pakistan and in its wake could generate a fresh set of strategic uncertainties for Pakistan vis-à-vis the United States and India.
China's objectives in its quasi-strategic alliance with Pakistan centre on creating a regional spoiler state against India and use it as a counter-pressure point against the United States. Sooner or later it will dawn on Pakistan that it cannot play double-games strategically with both these countries.
When it came to the crunch, China limited itself to issuing rhetorical ultimatums to India without any substantial military commitment to Pakistan.
Concluding Observations
Pakistan in 2005 presents a painful picture of an "Uncertain Nation". It is uncertain of its own national identity and mistrusts the aspirations for democracy of the Pakistani masses. The unholy combination of the Pakistan Army and its Generals, in league with the mullah-theocracy, a self-serving bureaucracy and a strong feudal elite will keep Pakistan away from democracy. Such an environment nurtures their lack of accountability and their corrupt practices.
A new Pakistan, sure and confident of itself, and mastering its national uncertainties can only emerge when the Pakistani masses sweep away the unholy combination stated above.
The United States could assist in the emergence of democracy in Pakistan, but it will not, because its strategic interests are best secured in an environment of Pakistan's national uncertainties. China cannot be expected to insist on democracy in Pakistan, when it itself is not a functional democracy, in addition to the reasons that apply to USA.
India is best equipped to insist on democracy in Pakistan. As a viable, functional, and the largest democracy in the world, India should refuse to enter into any peace dialogue with Pakistan unless democracy comes to Pakistan. India should not follow a selective approach to democracy in South Asia – insisting on it for Nepal and suffering from amnesia when it comes to Pakistan.
Ultimately, the heavy burden of ridding Pakistan of its national uncertainties rests on the shoulders of the Pakistani peoples. They must become the masters of their own destiny and unshackle Pakistan from its vested interests' nationally imposed bondage.
The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group.